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Abstract  
Practice-based research in art and design is only partially amenable to discursive explication. In an 
educational framework that relies on notions of master/student relationships, in which the former is 
supposed to pass knowledge on to the latter, this fact often creates anxieties for both. 
From Jacques Rancière’s point of view, the master’s ignorance is important for the student’s 
emancipation. In his book on The Ignorant Schoolmaster, Joseph Jacotot, he claims that learners become 
emancipated through their own activities of observing, retaining, repeating, verifying, doing, reflecting, 
taking apart and combining differently. In support of this method of the riddle, the supervisor can teach best 
by not knowing the subject matter but, instead, providing positive constraints to help keep the researcher on 
her own path, acknowledging that no two orbits are alike. 
For any researcher to be able to discover anything new, she has to learn the different languages of 
theories, things and media. The foundation of such knowledge is, however, not the supervisor/master. Her 
role, in contrast, is to claim the equality of each intelligent being, to discourage false modesty in students, 
and to encourage them to make discoveries through experiment and experience: to be attentive and use their 
own intelligence. For this to happen, master and student need a thing in common that establishes an 
egalitarian intellectual link between them. In practice-based research in design and art, the thing in common 
emerges largely through non-discursive media and modes of thought. Here, what can be seen, what can be 
thought about it, and what it can mean is also matter of translation, which Walter Benjamin, in The Task of 
the Translator, described as a mutually complimentary relationship between the languages of original and 
translation. No language in itself can give form to truth – and the task of a translation is to reveal what 
remains repressed in the original. 
In the many forms of translation involved in creative-practice research, candidate and supervisor work 
‘between the lines’, in the interstices between the unknown and known, translating and re-translating. This 
paper explores, drawing on concepts by Benjamin, Rancière, Dewey, Wittgenstein and Kleist, which aspects 
help or prevent a situation in which students can respond to someone speaking to them, rather than 
examining them, under the sign of equality. 
Introduction 
Intellectual advance occurs in two ways. At times increase of knowledge is organized about old 
conceptions, while these are expanded, elaborated and refined, but not seriously revised, much 
less abandoned. At other times, the increase of knowledge demands qualitative rather than 
quantitative change; alteration, not addition. (Dewey, 1917, p.3) 
Research in art and design education, when it concerns specific ways of knowing through creative practice, 
is problematic on several counts. There is, on the one hand, an enduring sense on the part 
researchers/practitioners that this kind of research cannot properly develop within the framework of “old 
conceptions”. On the other hand, an insecurity prevails about how a qualitative change could be articulated 
to frame new conceptions. When research is carried out by postgraduate students under the supervision of 
academic researchers/practitioners, yet another facet makes this process problematic: once intellectual and 
creative advances have “crystallized into material of instruction” they begin to resist further change (Dewey, 
1917, p.4). The knowledge gained from creative advances, once absorbed into a canon, serves “ideas forced 
into experience, not gathered from it” (p.13). As objects of teaching, previously explorative practices that are 
largely reliant on responsive immediacy as well as reflection can become stultifying precedents. 
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Some, though not all, aspects of knowing through creative practice are difficult to fit into discursive 
modes of articulation. Getting-to-know through creative practice is at times even dependent on not-knowing, 
or not-yet-knowing, how to speak. Explication, therefore, is rarely a successful approach to creative practice 
research. It too easily stands in the way of experimentation and experience. How can supervisors in such 
contexts help candidates to develop new conceptions and articulate processes of coming-to-know in ways 
that will make their explorations stack up as research in the academy? 
Anxious questions arise: is creative practice-based research even a legitimate form of research? What is 
its disciplinary field? How much can a supervisor know of what the candidate needs to learn? When these 
anxieties and insecurities lead to disciplinary entrenchment and an insistence on what is perceived to be a 
discipline’s objects or methods, the supervisor becomes, willingly or not, a master of her field, who ‘gives’ 
knowledge, defines goals and deficiencies, and explicates knowledge to always lacking students. 
The Ignorant Schoolmaster 
Jacques Rancière, in The Ignorant Schoolmaster, recounts the story of Joseph Jacotot, whose extraordinary 
teaching practices upset the educational environment of Europe in the 1820s and 30s (Ross, 1991, p.58).1 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Jacotot fled the political turmoil in France and subsequently 
became a lecturer in French literature at the University of Louvain.2 There, necessity “constrained him to 
leave his intelligence entirely out of the picture” (Rancière, 1991, p.9). Jacotot spoke no Flemish – and a 
number of his Flemish students spoke no French. This impasse led him to develop a method which reversed 
the roles of passive students and “master explicator”: Jacotot gave the students a bilingual edition of 
Fenelon’s Utopian novel Telemaque to compare the Flemish and French words, thereby learning French 
through this comparison. When the students had read the first half of the book, he tested them and made 
them repeat it over and over. That they succeeded in learning French in a remarkably short time convinced 
Jacotot that teachers can teach what they don’t know, and that individuals can instruct themselves “by 
observing and retaining, repeating and verifying, by relating what they were trying to know to what they 
already knew, by doing and reflecting about what they had done” (p.10). In so doing, they 
moved along in a manner one shouldn’t move along – the way children move, blindly, figuring 
out riddles. And the question then became: wasn’t it necessary to overturn the admissible order 
of intellectual values? Wasn’t that shameful method of the riddle the true movement of human 
intelligence taking possession of its own powers? (p.10) 
This intellectual emancipation can liberate students from the pedagogies of explication which hinder, rather 
than help, their learning. It is the explicator who needs the student, rather than the other way round. He 
therefore creates a constant and structural gap between the student’s incapacity to understand and the 
established knowledge of the discipline: “To explain something to someone is first of all to show him he 
cannot understand it by himself.” (Woodill, 1993, p.6) By assuming superiority over the student, the 
educator renders the student’s knowledge inferior, divides intelligence into two (Rancière, 1991, p.7).  
Since the learned master’s knowledge gets in the way of the students’ emancipation, it is better if he 
knows nothing of the subject he teaches. Otherwise, even if he wants to draw out the students’ knowledge by 
questioning, his Socratic approach to learning would be “the most formidable form of stultification”. It 
would be yet another form of instruction that “pretends to lead the student to his own knowledge” but is, in 
reality, the “method of the riding school master” (p.59). The latter orders turns and detours, after each single 
one of which the student discovers something that he increasingly feels he would never have discovered by 
himself. But not only the student is stultified in this pedagogical relationship: so is the educator, who 
deprives himself of equals who could understand him (p.39). 
Instead, what can be passed on is “not the key of knowledge, but the consciousness of what an 
intelligence can do when it considers itself equal to any other and considers any other equal to itself” (p.39). 
In a “community of equals”, a “society of artists”, the division between who knows and who doesn’t know 
would be repudiated (p.71). This community would only know “minds in action”: 
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people who do, who speak about what they are doing, and who thus transform all their works 
into ways of demonstrating the humanity that is in them as in everyone. Such people would 
know that no one is born with more intelligence than his neighbour, that the superiority that 
someone might manifest is only the fruit of as tenacious an application to working with words 
as another might show to working with tools; that the inferiority of someone else is the 
consequence of circumstances that didn’t compel him to seek harder (p. 71). 
Rather than by knowing the subject matter best, the educator/supervisor provides positive constraints to help 
keep the researcher on her own path, acknowledging that “no two orbits are alike” (p.59). 
What makes a supervisor? The institution? The discipline? The candidate? 
The vast differences between art and design students’ orbits, particularly at postgraduate level, make 
supervision sometimes appear daunting and frequently stretch the supervisor’s resources.  
At AUT University, we worry perhaps more than educators in other institutions about our lacking 
capacities. We see ourselves as constantly grappling, more than others, with multiple levels of change – 
which, to an extent, is correct. AUT cannot rely on established traditions in postgraduate education and its 
relatively recent past as a technical institute is still palpable. The anxieties over what counts as knowledge, 
and how much it is constantly in flux, are therefore bound to be higher than elsewhere and seem to produce 
doubt about interdisciplinary approaches. The latter can produce stress, and many supervisors feel ill at ease 
when they have to operate out of their disciplinary comfort zones. Under stress, it may be difficult to realise 
that a discipline is “always much more than an ensemble of procedures which permit the thought of a given 
territory of objects” but is, first of all, “the constitution of this territory itself, and therefore the establishment 
of a certain distribution of the thinkable” (Rancière, 2006, p.8). When words, images and objects circulate 
freely, outside of the control of a master or a discipline, disciplinary thought “must ceaselessly hinder this 
haemorrhage in order to establish stable relations … and the modes of perception and signification which 
correspond to them”. It must claim back its territory, its objects and its methods (p. 9) to stabilise always 
uncertain boundaries (p.11). A recent experience in that field (defined by notions of mastery and 
disciplinarity) persuaded me to write this paper.  
In AUT’s off-campus delivery of the Master of Art and Design course, normal conditions are exasperated 
in ways that sometimes remind me of Jacotot’s exile in Belgium: in each regional ‘pod’, teams of two 
lecturers share the delivery of studio practice and theory in the first year. In the second, the thesis year, 
supervisors are allocated partially on the principle of continuity, and partially on the base of specialist 
knowledge.3 With fewer supervisors available to deal with a wide, and often interdisciplinary range of 
concerns, and with limited face-to-face contact, off-campus students have to work more independently from 
the start. Consequently, the projects of off-campus students are often rather unconventional. This can be 
intimidating for supervisors, whose acquaintance with a project is always limited and who engage with 
candidates mostly on-line and via telephone calls. What we, as supervisors, can see on a computer screen is a 
far cry from the ‘real thing’ (unless the project is about digital design). With very limited control over the 
students’ working habits and research methods, we have to muster the courage to let students go their own 
way and trust their intelligence. Their work, as we witness it evolving, becomes the thing we have in 
common.4.  
A thesis, entitled Urban Voodoo, by a candidate from Whangarei dealt with possibilities of upsetting 
existing semiotic systems, produced by a society which has no place for some of its members (see Rancière, 
2001). The material articulation of this exploration involved multilayered encodings of graffiti and tagging 
found in a local skate park – presented finally as a series of eight large-scale wooden ‘pou whenua’, 
alongside more than one hundred digitally manipulated/coded images displayed in cd jewel cases along the 
gallery walls, and annotated in pencil with quotations from Gothic Rock or Heavy Metal songs. As the 
supervisor, I was out of my depth concerning much of the content, and most of the media of the final 
installation.  
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On the day before the candidate’s examination and subsequent exhibition opening, I flew up North, full of 
confidence in one respect (“He will have pulled it off, I’m sure”) and nervously doubtful, in another (“What 
if I let him down by not breathing down his neck enough? Have I overstepped my competence or neglected 
my duty?”). The nervous doubt disappeared as soon as I saw the installation of Israe Paraone’s final work. 
While I could not judge some singular aspects from an expert’s perspective, the whole was convincing and 
seemed thoroughly thought out and worked through. After all the risks Israe had taken in his research 
process (there were so many that I sometimes felt I had to fasten my seatbelt – not knowing where we were 
going and how we would arrive), the multiple and sometimes disparate aspects of his work had come 
together. He had successfully enacted his research questions of the last two years and offered provisional 
suggestions. All that was left for me to do was to ask clarifying questions, talk through the anticipated 
choreography of the examination, and make minor suggestions about changing one spatial aspect. 
The following day, Israe told me that the examination had been an incredibly rewarding experience for 
him – no matter what the grade might turn out to be. Israe almost used Rancièrian language: he felt that the 
examiners and he had wanted to recognise and respond to the situation – “not as students or as learned men, 
but as people; in the way you respond to someone speaking to you and not to someone examining you: under 
the sign of equality” (Rancière, 1991, p.11). Clearly, the interest in his work, and the confidence placed in 
him, was also the main reason why his two years of masters studies had been rewarding for him. The active 
presence of two fellow students at the subsequent exhibition opening, who had started the course with Israe 
two years earlier, was another indication of the development of a community of equals, that society of artists 
which can potentially render irrelevant the division between who knows and who doesn’t know. 
On the way back to Auckland, I realised that my initial nervousness had had a lot to do with ongoing 
discussions in our School, particularly in postgraduate studies. A lot to do with questions of how competent 
one has to be, and can be under the prevailing conditions, and what it takes to support students in their 
projects. Disciplines can provide comfort zones, and being stretched too far, and too often, can make people 
retrench into disciplinary comfort. An educational framework that relies on notions of master/student 
relationships, in which the former is supposed to pass on knowledge to the latter, often creates anxieties for 
both. However, observing Israe Paraone completing his unusual project with such insight and confidence, 
like several other students on the off-campus programme before, persuaded me that disciplinary knowledge 
is not the most important characteristic of a good supervisor but, rather, the ability to oblige students to use 
their own intelligence, to give them confidence, but also to compel them to seek harder through a “tenacious 
… application to working with words”, materials and tools.  
Practice based research – head and hand 
While any researcher, to discover anything new, has to learn the different languages of theories, things and 
media, the foundation of such knowledge, for Jacotot, is not the supervisor/master (as in Donald Schön’s 
studio master).5 Her role, in contrast, is to claim the equality of each intelligent being, to discourage false 
modesty in students, and to encourage them to make discoveries through experiment and experience: to be 
attentive and use their own intelligence. For this to happen, master and student need a thing in common (for 
instance, as in Jacotot’s case, a book) that establishes an egalitarian intellectual link between them 
(Rancière, 1991, p.13).6 
The thing in common, placed between two minds, is the gauge of that equality, and this in two 
ways. A material thing is first of all “the only bridge of communication between two minds.” 
The bridge is a passage, but it is also distance maintained. The materiality of the book [or, 
sculpture, painting, design …] keeps two minds at an equal distance, whereas explication is the 
annihilation of one mind by another. But the thing is also an always available source of material 
verification … (p.32) 
This source of material verification is crucial in creative practice-based research with its partially non-
discursive nature.  
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When something cannot be rendered discursive, the ways of knowing about it must be different. Both 
Walter Benjamin and Ludwig Wittgenstein insisted occasionally on not having anything to say but only to 
show. But, unlike Wittgenstein, who held that a gesture “tries to portray, but cannot do it” (1958, S.434), 
Benjamin thought that gestures could, at least, be made quotable. This is not done by talking, but by 
carefully interrupting a context to create space for them (Benjamin, 1969b, p.151). Creative practice-based 
research deals with what Benjamin once, according to Theodor W. Adorno, defined as the “ability to 
interpolate in the smallest dimension”. There is “something inherent in the materials and forms that the artist 
receives … something that manifests itself in them as a clearly articulated problem. Creative fantasy … 
awakens what has been accumulated. Its steps, always minimal, respond to the wordless questions posed by 
the materials and forms in their silent language of things” (Adorno, 1967, pp.117-8). 
To articulate these questions and responses within academic frameworks requires access to particularly 
appropriate forms of expression. Language, when used for this purpose, can be an awkward externalisation 
of half-understood knowledge. However awkward, though, language is intermittently necessary to co-
produce and co-create, initially, the material one can learn from. In grappling with always insufficient 
language, in disturbing and spacing the flow of historical time, many researchers in art and design endeavour 
to find or create images “wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a 
constellation” (Benjamin, 2002, N2a,3) which may “attain to legibility” (N3,1), and, then, quotability.7 
Benjamin’s interest in pedagogy led him to look closely at images, his visual thinking combining with 
discursive reflexivity.  
Experience and reflexivity, translation and story telling 
“But experience in its vital form is experimental, an effort to change the given; it is 
characterized by projection, by reaching forward into the unknown” (Dewey, 1917: 7) 
In comparison with explicatory instruction, project based approaches to teaching and research, such as 
reflection-in-action (Schön, 1985) seem to give far more control over their projects to students. However, at 
closer range, the disparity between teacher and student seems even greater in Schön’s framework (see 
Newman, 1999, pp.49ff). In practice, it is problematic simply to demand self-reflexitivity from students or 
even strongly recommend it without a substantial explanation of what self-reflexivity is. Schön’s concept of 
reflection-in-action has been repeatedly criticised for a lack of understanding of the simultaneity or 
sequentiality of reflection and action (e.g., Hatton & Smith, 1995) but remains a widely accepted model for 
creative practice and theory. There is even a greater problem when the self-reflexivity demanded of students 
is not matched by an equal self-reflexivity on the part of lecturers (Webster, 2005, p.281).8 
No doubt, it is on occasion helpful to show a student something, rather than talk about it (e.g., 
demonstrate conventions and methods). But such demonstrations can also foster a mastery/mystery 
relationship that makes students dependent on the master (who cannot explain, only show) and thereby stifle 
students’ own explorations.9 Much of studio teaching, alternatively, consists of asking the student questions 
about their intention, method, choices, etc. Again, these questions can support candidates’ own efforts to 
clarify their project, position and pathway. Heinrich von Kleist (1982), for instance, shows how the expectant 
look on his sister’s face spurs him on to develop thoughts that are only vaguely formed. Interestingly, 
Kleist’s sister is not an expert in the matters that concern him. However, questions can equally contribute to 
a student’s sense of being led by the nose.10 The Socratic inquiry is an entirely different situation from one 
where the master’s role is primarily one to observe, witness and act as a reference point.  
Benjamin and Dewey attempted to think in an anti-dualistic manner about experience. They both 
questioned how subject/object and mind/matter relationships have long been portrayed in Western thought. 
Dewey noted that, when we do something to a thing, in creative practice and elsewhere, the thing then does 
something to us in turn (“Experience and Thinking” in 1916). Experience is a process in which the 
agent/patient undergoes “a process of standing something; of suffering and passion, of affection” (1917: 10). 
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Simultaneously doing and suffering, experience consists of experiments, active trying and tests of oneself 
(p.11). 
There is a tactility in such experience that is not easily amenable to words but does create forms of 
knowledge. Esther Leslie notes that “to touch the worlds is to know the world” and that, according to 
Benjamin, the “hand marks out genuine experience” and its touch “fingers the world’s textures, and passes 
on knowledge of those textures” (Leslie, n.d.) Matter, then, can be renewed in presentation, play and 
memory. These activities in creative practice research are all forms of translation and story telling, in which 
candidate and supervisor ideally work together ‘between the lines’, in the interstices between the unknown 
and known, translating and re-translating. What can be thought about research subject and object is a matter 
of translation, which Walter Benjamin, in The Task of the Translator, described as a mutually complimentary 
relationship between the languages of original and translation. No language in itself can give form to truth – 
neither the languages of words nor those of things – and the task of a translation is to reveal what remains 
repressed in the original (Benjamin, 1969a). Similarly, storytelling or recounting presumes a mutuality 
between storyteller and listeners which is based on a principal equality: that they share the same intelligence 
(Ross, 1991, p.69). The understanding, which storytelling presumes, is itself  
never more than translating, that is, giving the equivalent of a text, but in no way its reason. 
There is nothing behind the written page, no false bottom that necessitates the work of another 
intelligence, that of the explicator; no language of the master, no language of the language 
whose words and sentences are able to speak the reason of the words and sentences of a text. … 
Learning and understanding are two ways of expressing the same act of translation. There is 
nothing beyond texts except the will to express, that is, to translate. (Rancière, 1991, pp.9-10) 
From the cockpit into the passenger’s seat 
Certainly, something has to be learned, to begin with, so that further learning can then be autonomously 
related to it. Some teaching has to take place to provide students with a basis to start from. However, for 
Jacotot this teaching consisted in supplying resources, encouraging students to discover through experiment, 
and compelling them to keep on learning when they became distracted and lacked attention. As for the rest, 
the master’s role consisted of discouraging false modesty and, instead, assuring students that they had an 
intelligence they could use. This is the case for all ages of students and stages of studies.  
In the case of postgraduate research, in particular, students have already acquired fluency with regard to 
content, as well as media, of their disciplines. Given the candidates’ increasing degree of specialisation and 
the variety of their approaches, it would be unrealistic to expect that supervisors have much to pass on to 
individual candidates in all cases. The usefulness of specific knowledge they do bring to any candidate’s 
project depends on how that knowledge is made available: if a supervisor respects the “lived knowledge and 
the practical survival skills” (Woodill, 1993, p.53) of his research students, and draws on them as much as on 
his or her own, then supervisor and student both become simultaneously teachers and learners. A 
demystification is likely to ensue and both (or all) participants in the research project share responsibility. 
The supervisor can let go of anxious responsibility and the student take more control of his own project – in 
a creative practice exploration which involves everyone’s knowledge, as well as ignorance (p.51) 
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Notes 
 
1: “In summary, the aesthetic, from the beginning of its modern career, has been deeply implicated in what is now 
termed the political, though in Romantic and Idealist thought this was chiefly designated by way of a vocabulary of 
pedagogy (Bildung, Erziehung).“ (Gelley, 1999, p..938) 
2
  See Woodill (1993) 
3
  Thus, I as a designer end up supervising visual arts theses that often only vaguely fit into my theoretical or 
disciplinary area. This can be exhausting, but it is also extending. I am perhaps less anxious about this challenge 
than my colleagues, because I can rely on my own Ph.D experience at Auckland University with a supervisor who 
didn’t know much about my subject matter – and didn’t worry too much about it. The result seems to have been up 
to scratch. That, amongst other reasons, makes me think that Rancière (or, more precisely, Jacotot) has a point when 
he insists that the master’s ignorance provides potential of emancipation for the student. 
4
  See Practice based research below. 
5
  See Schön (1985) 
6
  “By leaving his intelligence out of the picture, he had allowed their intelligence to grapple with that of the book. … 
A pure relationship of will to will had been established between master and student: a relationship wherein the 
master’s domination resulted in an entirely liberated relationship between the intelligence of the student and that of 
the book – the intelligence of the book that was also the thing in common, the egalitarian intellectual link between 
master and student.” (p.13) 
7
  See Stoessel (1983, p.161). 
8
  “Certainly, if tutors were to become more reflexive about the part they play in the review process then it may be 
possible for the event to change from being a ritual for the display of tutors’/reviewers’ egos and student submission 
to a celebration of student creativity and personal development through critical engagement with the field of 
architecture. If not, then the place of the architectural review in architectural education must surely be questioned.” 
(Webster, 2005, p. 181) 
9
  Cuff suggests that “the process of mystification and obfuscation to which architecture (and indeed all professions) 
are prone evolves from the need to mask … contradictions” (quoted in Ward, 1997: 507)}. The argument that some 
elements of design might indeed only be able to be approximated by language, ought not be used as an excuse for 
not trying to communicate and theorise about those that can. In a mastery/mystery configuration, students are not 
supported in exploring questions about the critical context of their work and its wider relevance. In the absence of a 
shared reference system, design decisions and evaluations cannot be argued and contextualized in experience with 
‘the world out there’, its conflicts and discourses. The mastery/mystery configuration does not lend itself to the 
fostering of such competencies. It is, indeed, remarkable how Schön can advocate Studio master/student 
dependency, having stated only eleven years earlier that traditional architectural education fails because of its 
elusive and mysterious treatment of architectural practice, its division from its clientele, its scanty relationship with 
various knowledge bases, and its genius cult. This all amounts to a situation where the ‘student is expected to 
acquire competence mysteriously on his own, or by association with extraordinary practitioners’ (Argyris & Schön, 
1974, pp.142-3). See also (Engels-Schwarzpaul, 2002, pp.275ff). 
10
  “The Socratic inquiry is not the holy question which awaits an answer and whose echo resounds in the response. … 
Rather, a mere means to compel conversation, it forcibly, even impudently, dissimulates, ironizes – for it already 
knows the answer all too precisely.” (Benjamin, 1996, p.53) 
